Court Dismisses David Rose LD30 Ballot Challenge

3 thoughts on “Court Dismisses David Rose LD30 Ballot Challenge”

1. Although the Constitution does not provide a clear-cut answer to whether states have the power to regulate matters beyond their borders, it does contain “first-in-time” rules that seek to reduce interstate friction. The most prominent of these is the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which requires that “[f]ull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” The Clause functions as a “nationally unifying force” that “altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws . . . of the others.” The Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, is “not an inexorable and unqualified command.” For instance, it has long been accepted that “public Acts” (statutes and common law) and “Records” (executive if doing so would violate a state’s “legitimate public policy” or would be “obnoxious to the public policy of the forum.” By contrast, “judicial Proceedings” (judgments, especially money judgments) have been accorded “exacting operation” and “nationwide force” regardless of policy conflict.

   In People v. Shear, for instance, the California Court of Appeal upheld the petitioner’s California conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm based on a prior Arizona felony conviction, even though his right to possess a weapon had previously been restored by Arizona. The court concluded that recognizing restoration would be “‘obnoxious to the public policy’” of California regarding limits on who can lawfully a possess firearm. According to the unanimous court, There can be few more significant public policies of this state than that of protecting the safety of its citizens by barring convicted felons, persons who have proved unfit to be entrusted with firearms, from possessing them. . . . . The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not preclude California from carrying out its public policy of prohibiting convicted felons within its borders from possessing firearms merely because defendant could lawfully possess firearms in Arizona. In Blackwell v. Haslam, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether a Georgia pardon that restored Blackwell’s right to possess a firearm must be recognized in Tennessee. Without pausing to categorize the pardon as an act, record, or judgment, the court directly addressed the public policy question. The court concluded that the two states were at “loggerheads”: Georgia allowed restoration of persons convicted of all felonies, whether violent or not, while Tennessee denied restoration eligibility to violent felons.1 Citing Shear, the court held that “the Tennessee statutes on firearm rights are borne of the State’s significant interest in ‘protecting the safety of its be entrusted with the possession of firearms.” The Blackwell court emphasized that because the restriction was part of the state’s penal code it was especially emblematic of its public policy. The legislature “made the public policy judgments inherent in discharging its constitutional duty” vis-à-vis firearms regulation, and the court felt no need to “‘abandon [its] fundamental policy in favor of the public policy of another jurisdiction.’” Requiring Tennessee to extend full faith and credit to Georgia’s restoration outcome would require “‘too large a sacrifice by [Tennessee] of its interests in a matter with which it is primarily concerned’ — protecting public safety and preventing crime.” In re Winston provides yet another example of state court resistance to a full faith and credit argument. In Winston, a New Jersey appellate court addressed whether Winston, who had secured from New York a “Certificate of Relief from Disabilities” for two prior New York felony convictions, could obtain a New Jersey firearm purchaser identification card and permit to purchase a firearm. The Winston court held that while the certificate removed the automatic firearm disability in New York, it did not “alter or affect the criminal conviction[s] to which it relates.” “The Full Faith and Credit Clause,” the Winston court wrote, “does not require New Jersey to ignore its law that treats such convictions as automatically disqualifying simply because the [New York] certificates remove that automatic disqualifier under New York’s gun laws.”

   Each of the foregoing challenges concerned restoration of the firearm right. Another collateral consequence spurring litigation concerns sister-state recognition of relief from the sex offender registration requirement, a claim that has been uniformly rejected. For instance, in Donlan v. State an individual moved to Nevada from California after California had terminated his registration requirement. Noting that the termination resulted from an executive administrative act, and was not a “judgment” of another state, the court invoked the full faith and credit public policy exception. California, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded, had “‘no authority to dictate to [Nevada] the manner in which it can best protect its citizenry from those convicted of sex offenses.’” According to the Donlan court, “Nevada does not need to dispense with its preferred mechanism for protecting its populace by virtue of a California executive branch administrative action that terminated Donlan’s requirement to register as a sex offender.” Similarly, in Rosin v. Monken the Seventh Circuit rejected a claim that Illinois must grant relief from registration based on a New York plea agreement expressly stating that the defendant need not register as a sex offender. The court reasoned that the agreement, despite being embodied in a judgment by the court, was important only “‘for claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes,’” and Illinois need not give effect to it. According to the Rosin court, “Illinois need not dispense with its preferred mechanism for protecting its citizenry by virtue merely of a foreign judgment that envisioned less restrictive requirements’ [sic] being imposed on the relevant sex offender.” The court closed by echoing the view adopted by other courts, stating that “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause was enacted to preclude the same matters’ [sic] being relitigated in different states as recalcitrant parties evade unfavorable judgments by moving elsewhere. It was never intended to allow one state to dictate the manner in which another state protects its populace.” As the preceding cases make clear, there is little reason to conclude that the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides a constitutional basis to require states to recognize and give effect to one another’s restoration outcomes. This is true regardless of whether restoration occurs by automatic operation of statutory law (an “Act”), administrative executive branch action (a “Record”), or even a judgment (a “Proceeding”). Not only does the public policy exception (whatever its merit) stand in the way, but so too does the reality that a sister-state judgment might serve only an evidentiary function and need not be given legal effect by the forum.

   Judge Herrod the Great got it wrong. Esposito will win on appeal.

   With firearms, for instance, some states have very demanding restoration requirements, such as requiring an individualized finding of fitness or a pardon. Some states preclude restoration altogether, whereas others simply require a period of conviction-free years or never restrict the right in the first instance. With jury service, the right can be restored automatically upon completion of sentence, yet in some states it is not subject to restoration, or requires a pardon. With respect to employment, many states require that there be a nexus between the nature of the offense of conviction and the occupation in question. Some states do not require this nexus, and others only impose a limit during correctional supervision.

   Further highlighting state prerogative, significant variations exist in the eligibility criteria and procedures used by states when affording collateral consequences relief to individuals convicted in their own courts. Even pardons, the most traditional avenue for relief, vary significantly. States offer different kinds of pardons with different justifications and the pardons themselves differ significantly in the kinds of relief that they afford.1 Pardons also vary in their eligibility criteria: they can be based on no or nebulous criteria, attach no or little express importance to rehabilitation, and even result from simple personal or political predilection of governors. Finally, enormous variation exists regarding the eligibility criteria for expungement and its effect.

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   1. Extremely well thought out viewpient. Thanks for sharing it!

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2. candidate David Michael Rose is under intense fire and for good reason. A Superior Court filing dated 4/15 (AZ Supreme Court case CV-26-0129-AP/EL, personally assigned by the Supreme Court which reached out to Esposito about scheduling) documents that court administrators fielded calls from defendant david Rose himself about his ongoing case. This, even though he’s represented by counsel. The court’s stern order? “IT IS ORDERED defendant is to contact his counsel with any questions regarding his case.” Why is a political candidate phoning the court directly, ignoring basic legal protocol? Voters deserve answers. But wait, there’s more from recent proceedings: The judge slipped and used the term “expungement.” Let’s be crystal clear what that means, expungement is a highly discretionary judicial process that legally seals or removes records of an arrest, charge, or conviction, effectively treating it as if it never occurred for most practical purposes. It’s fundamentally different from a full pardon, an administrative partial pardon, or most importantly restoration of civil rights. Each of these serves distinct purposes, follows separate procedures, and carries unique effects on a person’s criminal record and broader rights restoration. David Michael Rose’s felony record has NOT been expunged. Period. Expungement has zero bearing on his eligibility to vote or hold public office in Arizona, as that’s governed by restoration of civil rights a completely separate matter that doesn’t erase the underlying record. The judge’s misstatement changes nothing about the facts of Rose’s history or his current candidacy qualifications. So, voters of LD3: Time to ask the tough questions of David Michael Rose. Can’t you afford to actually communicate through your hired attorney instead of pestering court staff? Are you simply unaware or willfully ignoring basic court rules that every represented party must follow? And why the smoke and mirrors around your felony record when “expungement” doesn’t apply and your eligibility hangs on something else entirely? This is all public record—do your homework, demand transparency, and hold candidates accountable. #AZPolitics #LD3 #VoteSmart

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